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Abstract: 
How is mindreading affected by social context? It is often implicitly assumed that 
there is one single way to understand others, whatever the situation or the identity of the 
person. In contrast, I emphasize the duality of functions of mindreading (social 
interaction and social observation), as well as the duality of social frames of reference 
(egocentric and allocentric). I argue in favour of a functional distinction between 
knowledge-oriented mindreading and interaction-oriented mindreading. They both aim at 
understanding other people‟s behaviour. But they do so using different strategies. 
However, to say that mindreading has two functions does not suffice to show that there 
are two kinds of mindreading. One and the same ability could accomplish different 
functions. Unfortunately, there has been almost no experimental data on a possible 
dissociation between two kinds of mindreading abilities. Nonetheless, I discuss a few 
results that point towards a dual ability.  
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What would be more relevant to Uta Frith‟s work and personality than to focus on the 
social dimension of cognition? I will not detail here how she has been able to create a real 
family atmosphere within her group and within the ICN, or how enjoyable it is to work 
with her. I will rather highlight some of the ideas that we had developed together in 
previous papers about social frames of reference (Frith and de Vignemont, 2005; de 
Vignemont and Frith, 2007). We suggested that there is more than one way to understand 
others and that it depends on the frame of reference of our social understanding. Here I 
will develop and refine the hypothesis of a dual mindreading ability. 
 
Social observation and social interaction 
The problem of other minds – or how I can understand others – has often been 
understood in such a way that there seems to be only one unique valid answer. The 
context should not matter, nor should the identity of the person one tries to understand. 
You could be conversing with someone, or seeing her converse with someone else; it 
could be your mother or a stranger in the street: the problem would stay the same, and the 
solution too. The literature in cognitive psychology for more than twenty years now has 
indeed provided a rather unilateral view of mindreading and social cognition. It is often 
assumed that there is one single way to understand the other, although people disagree on 
its nature. It is also often assumed that it is accomplished by a unique brain structure 
dedicated to the representation of mental states, like the temporo-parietal junction for 
instance (Saxe, 2006). Although Saxe agrees that social cognition involves more than 
that, she views mindreading per se as a unique ability realised by a unique brain 
structure. I will call this assumption the Single Perspective view. 
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We can contrast the Single Perspective view with what I will call the Dual Perspective 
view, which has been first defended by the philosopher Alfred Schütz, who founded 
phenomenological sociology in the thirties. In the Phenomenology of the Social World 
(1932), he made a distinction between two fundamental kinds of relationship with the 
other: social interaction and social observation. These two kinds of relationship are both 
oriented toward others. They both aim at understanding other people‟s behaviour. But 
they do so using different strategies. Social interaction is oriented toward persons that are 
considered as a „Thou,‟ as another agent that cannot be treated as an object. The 
interaction can consist of affecting the other‟s behaviour and experiences. The face-to-
face relationship is characterised by immediacy and flexibility. We can adjust to each 
other and I can test your reactions, to see how your assumed motives produce what you 
say. Furthermore, the environment can be guaranteed as a common one, shared in 
experience, which is useful in understanding the other. We can make unambiguous 
references to objects within our mutual reach, and check our guesses by questions. On the 
other hand, social observation is oriented toward persons located outside the nexus of 
intimacy. People are no longer perceived and reckoned with as unique individuals, but as 
instances of classes. For example, one expects policemen to act in certain ways, and thus 
we can relate to them in a prototypical way without ever knowing them as individuals. 
Such people are only relevant to us insofar as they correspond with our prototype. In 
social observation, I cannot modify your behaviour. Nonetheless, I can still guess your 
mental states based on inferences from the behaviour that I observe, on memories of 
similar past situations where I was involved, on general knowledge of prototypes of 
people based on assumptions of generalisability (e.g. policemen). I will validate my 
To appear in Quaterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 
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understanding according to my experience of the social world and my knowledge of the 
character of the observed persons, actual or typical. However, no testing is possible, since 
we can make no reference to objects, and cannot ask questions to check observations.  
In contrast to the Single Perspective view, Schütz distinguished two modes of 
relationship with the other based on phenomenological and epistemological differences 
between the two modes. His view is actually quite modern, although it was proposed 
more than 70 years ago. It goes in the same direction as some recent theories of the 
architecture of the mind that emphasise the possibility of multiple coding of the same 
category. One of the main proponents of such trend is Jackendoff (1996, p. 1): “The 
general idea is that the mind/brain encodes information in many distinct formats or 
„languages of the mind‟.” We can provide a series of examples of this principle in various 
domains of cognition.  
 Language: dual route of language understanding through the phonological 
pathway and the semantic pathway (Forster, 1979) 
 Number: dual route of counting through subitising and serial counting (Dehaene 
and Sybesma, 1999) 
 Body: dual representation of the body through the body schema dedicated to 
action and the body image dedicated to recognition (Paillard, 1999) 
 Action: dual representations of action, either semantic or pragmatic (Jeannerod, 
1997) 
 Vision: dual representation of visual inputs through the dorsal pathway of 
sensorimotor transformation and through the ventral pathway of object 
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recognition (Milner and Goodale, 1995) 
 Space: dual representation of the location of objects relative to other objects 
within an allocentric frame of reference and relative to the agent within an 
egocentric frame of reference (Pick and Lockman, 1981) 
Interestingly, one criterion of distinction is present in several of these examples. For the 
body, for action and for vision, the duality of coding results from a difference in 
functional role. On the one hand, there is a representation dedicated to the recognition 
and identification of the input. This semantic representation constitutes the basis for 
judgments about the input and about its properties (e.g. I believe that the ball is red). On 
the other hand, there is a representation dedicated to actions. This pragmatic 
representation is used to plan and control movements performed toward the input (e.g. 
the ball is big so I make a large grip aperture to grasp it). This distinction is founded on 
an impressive amount of evidence coming from physiology, psychophysics, 
neuropsychology and neuroscience (for review, see Jacob and Jeannerod, 2003). It has 
been shown not only for vision, but also for other sensory modalities like audition (Belin 
& Zatorre, 2000) and proprioception (Dijkerman & de Haan, in press). It seems to be 
widespread in the cognitive architecture and one might even wonder whether we could 
not extend it further by applying it to social cognition.  
Schütz‟s theory can indeed be reinterpreted in more cognitive terms using the 
Perception-Action model. If one takes seriously the parallel with the Perception-Action 
model, one would have first to describe the nature and the extent of the differences 
between social interaction and social observation. Putting it another way, one would have 
to show that social interaction and social observation rely on distinct cognitive 
To appear in Quaterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 
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mechanisms. To be exhaustive, the Dual Perspective view would have to specify the 
properties of each of these mechanisms and to provide empirical evidence of this 
distinction based on neuropsychological dissociations and on developmental data. 
However, this paper will be more exploratory and does not pretend to reach such level of 
achievement. I will rather suggest a weaker version of the Dual Perspective view. I will 
show that it makes a difference whether I understand the other in the context of social 
interaction or social observation. This difference could be explained by assuming either 
that there are two distinct mindreading abilities (i.e. strong version of the Dual 
Perspective view) or that there is one single ability, used differently given the context. I 
will leave this latter question open, although I will try to provide some suggestions that 
might be worth investigating experimentally. 
 
Functions of mindreading 
Mindreading is often characterised as the ability to understand and predict someone else‟s 
behaviour. This definition gives us what mindreading does, not what mindreading is for. 
We are supposed constantly to try to guess what others feel or think, but why do we do 
that? Is it just out of curiosity by a kind of voyeurism? Or is there anything beyond, that 
would be essential to our survival in society? Can the Perception-Action distinction also 
be applied to mindreading? 
Let us start with the false belief task, which is paradigmatic of the mindreading 
literature. The standard version presents the subject with a character, Sally, who puts a 
chocolate in her basket before leaving the room. In her absence, another character, Anne, 
removes the chocolate and places it in a box. Subjects are asked to predict, on Sally's 
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return to the room, where Sally will look for the object. Subjects have to make a 
judgment about what Sally believes. Mindreading here is considered as a strategy to form 
beliefs about someone else‟s mental states. It is what I will call knowledge-oriented. One 
uses mindreading in order to know what the other believes. Mindreading is a way to 
detect information about the other necessary to make judgments about mental properties. 
We can compare this function of mindreading with the function of the ventral pathway of 
vision, which is dedicated to the identification and recognition of the perceived object in 
order to make judgments about the properties of the object. In the same way that we have 
beliefs about the colour of the sofa for example, we have beliefs about other people‟s 
mental states, although in both cases the information is not directly relevant to us (e.g. we 
are not thinking of buying the sofa, nor do we intend to interact with the individuals to 
whom we ascribe mental states). 
However, one might suggest a different function of mindreading, as suggested by 
Rutherford (2004, p. 92): “One of the functions of ToM reasoning is to assess another‟s 
knowledge, beliefs, intentions, etc. in order to manipulate their behaviour.” Rutherford is 
interested in competitive situations. Fortunately, our social interactions are not limited to 
conflicts between individuals. As pointed out by Schütz (1937), there are different ways 
of affecting the behaviour of others. For instance, teaching involves being understood and 
remembered, and influencing the other's behaviour more positively. More generally, all 
situations of communication necessitate carrying a communicative intention in such a 
way that the other will understand it (Sperber and Wilson, 1986). Cooperation is another 
situation that involves mindreading. To cooperate, we must know that we have a shared 
intention (we both intend to do X). We are committed to mutual responsiveness and 
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mutual support (Bratman, 1992). Each agent must understand the other‟s intention to 
react accordingly. In all these distinct social situations, mindreading is what I will call 
interaction-oriented. One uses mindreading in order to be able to interact with others. 
The type of interaction can be very different. Yet, I would like to argue that all situations 
of interaction have something in common when mindreading is concerned. Mindreading 
is a way to detect information about other people‟s mental states to guide our behaviour 
with them. We can compare this function of mindreading with the function of the dorsal 
pathway of vision, which is dedicated to sensorimotor transformations to perform actions 
toward the perceived object. In the same way that we represent the width of a glass in 
order to adjust our grip aperture, we represent other people‟s mental states in order to 
adjust our own behaviour and to interact with them. 
Consequently, there are two functions of mindreading. On the one hand, it can be 
knowledge-oriented. On the other hand, it can be interaction-oriented. But does it really 
make a difference?   
 
Social Frames of Reference 
Let us compare two everyday life situations illustrating the distinction between 
knowledge-oriented and interaction-oriented mindreading (see Figure 1).  
(a) In the metro, I listen to two other travellers who have an argument together. Let 
us call them Peter and Mary.  
(b) At one point they start to pay attention to me and Peter accuses me of spying on 
them. We have an argument together.  
To appear in Quaterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 
 10 
The first stage (a) corresponds to what Schütz calls social observation. I try to guess the 
background of their argument: Peter does not like that Mary came back too late last night 
and believes that she is cheating on him; she thinks that he is being unfair. The second 
stage (b) is a case of social interaction, a rather conflictive one. I am directly involved in 
the argument, and no longer an external witness. I try to understand why Peter is so angry 
with me in order to calm him down. At both stages, I ascribe mental states to Peter, 
although for different purposes. At the beginning, I just want to kill time and entertain 
myself; afterwards I just want to find a good way to react and to stop this argument. Do I 
use the same strategy in both situations? What are the differences between knowledge-
oriented and interaction-oriented mindreading? I will consider two ways to understand 
the difference: scope of interest and frame of reference. Although none of these 
differences exhausts the distinction between social observation and social interaction, 
they will allow us to refine the contrast between the two kinds of mindreading.  
INSERT FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE 
At the core of the Perception-Action distinction, there is the idea that the visual system 
does not process the same type of information for action and for perception. For instance, 
if I want to grasp a glass, I need to encode the size of the glass to program my grip 
aperture. But its colour might not be relevant for my motor system. Similarly, in 
interaction-oriented mindreading, I am interested only in the pieces of information that 
are relevant for interacting. For instance, it is important for me to detect if Peter has the 
intention to hit me, but I do not need to know what he thinks of the government. More 
generally, understanding the intentions of others plays a key role for social interaction 
and constitutes „a foundational skill‟, whether it is for communication, for competition or 
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for cooperation: „these two dimensions of human expertise – reading intentions and 
interacting with others culturally – are intimately related‟ (Tomasello et al., 2005, p. 675). 
In contrast, the scope of knowledge-oriented mindreading is broader. It includes all the 
mental properties, as diverse as food-related desires, religious beliefs, emotional state, 
etc. However, based on this distinction, we cannot draw a sharp boundary between 
knowledge-oriented and interaction-oriented mindreading. What is relevant varies 
between each social interaction.  
A different way to approach the distinction may be to look not at the information 
encoded, but at the way the information is encoded. In our example, at the beginning, 
Peter is considered from a third-person perspective. I refer to him with a „he‟. Later, 
while arguing with him, I refer to him with a „you‟. With Uta Frith, we have emphasised 
the importance of the distinction between the third-person (the other unrelated to the 
self), and the second-person (the other related to the self), this distinction between the 
latter two perspectives being often neglected (Frith and de Vignemont, 2005). Drawing 
further on the parallel with the Perception-Action distinction, we have suggested that one 
needs to take into account the frame of reference in which the other is encoded. We 
propose that it makes a difference to mindreading whether the other person is understood 
using an egocentric („„you‟‟) or an allocentric („„he/ she/they‟‟) stance. 
The distinction between egocentric and allocentric representations was first made in 
spatial cognition. A frame of reference was first defined as „a locus or set of loci with 
respect to which spatial position is defined‟ (Pick and Lockman, 1981, p. 40). The spatial 
location of an object can be encoded either in its perceptual relation to the agent (e.g. the 
apple is in front of me) or in terms of its surroundings independently of the agent (e.g. the 
To appear in Quaterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 
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apple is on the table). The former frame of reference is egocentric, centred on the agent, 
whether the agent is me, you or a third person. The latter frame of reference is allocentric, 
which does not depend on the presence of the agent, or on her location. Similarly, we 
have suggested that one can adopt either an egocentric or an allocentric stance toward the 
other. When one takes an egocentric stance, one understands the other person relative to 
oneself. When one takes an allocentric stance, one represents the other in her relationship 
with other individuals independently of oneself.  
However, the notion of social frames of reference may seem obscure. In the case of 
spatial cognition, the relationship is spatial. But what is the nature of the relationship in 
social cognition? There are at least two components. The first component is external. It is 
the relationship between the individuals in the society (e.g. a relative, a colleague, a 
friend, etc.). Interestingly, Piaget pointed out that young children can easily understand 
the relationship between themselves and their mother but have more difficulties in 
understanding that their mother is also their father‟s wife. They understand the egocentric 
relationship with their mother, but not the allocentric relationship between their mother 
and their father. The second component is internal and concerns the content of the 
target‟s mental states. People have thoughts directed towards other people. The 
egocentric stance is interested in thoughts directed towards me. The allocentric stance is 
interested in thoughts directed towards others. Let us go back to Peter and Mary. At the 
beginning, I understand Peter and Mary in an allocentric frame of reference 
independently of myself: I understand that Mary is Peter‟s girlfriend (i.e. allocentric 
social relationship) and I mindread that Peter thinks that Mary is cheating on him (i.e. 
allocentric reference). Later, I understand Peter and Mary in an egocentric frame of 
To appear in Quaterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 
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reference centred on myself: I understand that Peter is a stranger that I will never meet 
again (i.e. egocentric social relationship) and I mindread that Peter is angry with me (i.e. 
egocentric reference).  
I would like to argue that the egocentric frame of reference is necessary to interact 
with others. In spatial cognition, the egocentric representation of the location of the 
perceived object is directly linked to the actions that the agent can perform toward the 
object: it is only if I know where the apple is relative to my body that I can reach it. 
Similarly, in social cognition, one needs to understand the other relative to oneself if one 
wants to cooperate, compete or communicate. For example, to react properly to Peter, I 
need to know that it is with me and not with anybody else, that he is angry. I also need to 
take into account the fact that I will never see him again, so I do not care too much if he 
leaves upset. Both egocentric types of information – self-reference and egocentric social 
relationship – are thus necessary for interacting with Peter. The situation is the same for 
cooperation. It relies on the mutual knowledge that we both have „the intention that we do 
X‟ (Bratman, 1992). To be able to form such an intention, I need to relate the other to 
myself, creating the first-person plural (e.g. I + you = we). I need to understand that the 
other intends to do the work with me, and not with anybody else. And when the other 
holds a paintbrush in my direction, I need to understand that it is to me that the other 
gives the paintbrush so that we paint the house together. In communication too, I need to 
understand that your communicative intentions are addressed to me. It is easy to see what 
happens when we fail to understand the egocentric reference. For instance, as long as you 
do not understand that the chairman of a conference is pointing at you, you cannot ask 
your question. Conversely, you might start speaking while it was not your turn. It is thus 
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important to understand self-reference. Interestingly, it has been shown that for the same 
level of syntactical complexity, children understand more easily sentences that are 
referring to themselves than those referring to others and than impersonal sentences 
(Mood, 1979). Putting it another way, in the same way that one cannot reach a glass if 
one does not know where the glass is relative to oneself, one cannot talk and work with 
others if one does not know what the other thinks of oneself. 
What is then the relationship between the egocentric stance and the classical notion of 
egocentrism, which has a long history in psychology? Egocentrism actually covers 
several distinct concepts. It can be tracked down to Piaget and the Three-Mountains 
problem (Piaget & Inhelder, 1948/1956). A child is egocentric if he is unable to 
distinguish his own spatial perspective and someone else‟s perspective on the world. 
Egocentrism is characterised by the saliency of one‟s own perspective, leading to an 
inability to disregard one‟s own experiences and to imagine other people‟s experiences. 
The child therefore assumes that all people will react like him. A second type of 
egocentrism arises during adolescence. It is characterised by two main personality 
features: the imaginary audience and the personal fable (Elkind, 1967). First, adolescents 
believe that other people‟s thoughts centre on them. In this respect, they play to an 
imaginary audience perceiving that others share their own self concerns. Second, 
adolescents convince themselves that their emotions and experiences are entirely unique. 
Egocentrism in adolescence can be thus defined by self-concern with no concern for 
others. It is related to what is considered as egocentric speech, characterised by 
monologue, repetition, muttering, self-answered question and frequent self-reference 
(Garvey and Hogan, 1973). For instance, children‟s discourse often mentions the other‟s 
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behaviour toward themselves, their own behaviour or affective attitude toward the other, 
or they compare themselves to others (Honess, 1980). Another aspect of egocentrism is 
imposing one‟s will. For instance, individuals with Asperger syndrome want other people 
to behave exactly as they want and get very frustrated if they are not obeyed (Moore, 
2004). In summary, egocentrism can be defined according to three different axes: (i) lack 
of understanding of the other; (ii) lack of interest towards the other; and (iii) lack of 
respect for the other‟s will.  
In all these cases, the egocentric frame of reference is pushed to its limits, so much 
that it becomes an obstacle to social interaction. Defining the other by her relationship to 
the self is not denying the other. Egocentrism results when the social world is not only 
centred on the self but is reduced to the self. We suggested, with Uta Frith, that 
egocentrism results from a lack of interaction between egocentric and allocentric 
representations of others (Frith and de Vignemont, 2005). In normal adults, the 
egocentric and allocentric stances interact constantly with each other. Allocentric and 
egocentric representations are complementary. In spatial cognition, an allocentric 
representation of an object allows one to link this object to other objects, independently 
of the agent. Objects have to be perceived in their mutual relationship in allocentric 
coordinates to be perceived in their own right. Similarly, the allocentric representation of 
others is detached from possible interactions with them. It secures the existence of the 
other person independently of the relationship one may have with her. A second role 
played by the allocentric frame of reference is that it allows one to understand the social 
world. By observing others and understanding their mutual relationships, one can learn 
about the social rules and the social structure. This knowledge can be later used during 
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social interactions. Therefore, one needs both egocentric and allocentric representations 
of others to achieve satisfying interactions with others.  
However, some people may doubt the possibility of non-egocentric frame of reference. 
They may argue that egocentrism is not something that happens only to young children or 
adolescents. It would be more pervasive than that. For example, social psychology has 
studied extensively what has been called the „contrast effect‟ (Dunning and Hayes, 1996). 
Contrast effects occur when people judge the behaviour and attitudes of others relative to 
their own. They use their own particular behaviours as norms when evaluating the 
performances of others. For instance, if you go swimming every day, you will judge that 
the person that goes swimming only once a week is not very sporty. Conversely, if you 
never go swimming, you will consider the weekly swimmer as sporty. The other is 
judged in a frame of reference centred on the self. Another well-known example is the 
„curse of knowledge‟. Even adults have difficulties in inhibiting what they themselves 
know to predict someone else‟s behaviour. For instance, well-informed subjects had to 
predict what others less-informed people would forecast for the earning of a company. 
Despite the fact that they knew that they were less-informed, still they predicted that they 
would say what they themselves forecasted (Camerer, Loewenstein, Weber, 1989). Such 
egocentric biases happen not only for knowledge but also for values and feelings (for 
review, see Goldman, 2006). Does it mean that egocentric reference always invades 
mindreading? Can we really get rid of the self in understanding others?  
My reply to this is twofold. First, although egocentric biases are indeed more frequent 
than one might think, fortunately they are not always the rule. Most of the time, we are 
able to „quarantine‟ our own feelings and beliefs from our understanding of others 
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(Goldman, 2006). Mindreading is not necessarily contaminated by egocentric biases. The 
second point that I want to make is more theoretical. The fact that we use egocentric 
reference when making judgments about other people in situations of social observation 
is not self-contradictory. The egocentric/allocentric distinction is not equivalent to the 
distinction between interaction-oriented and knowledge-oriented mindreading. This is 
true of spatial cognition too. The fact that the glass is in front of me is necessary for 
action, but it can also constitute the content of a conscious perceptual belief. Egocentric 
representations can be used by both visual systems. The distinction between the two 
frames of reference does not perfectly overlap with the distinction between the two 
functions of mindreading. All I want to claim is that the egocentric frame of reference is 
necessary for social interaction, while it is not necessary for social observation. In this 
sense, it constitutes a difference between the two types of mindreading.  
However, we have not yet provided any conclusive evidence that knowledge-oriented 
and interaction-oriented mindreading rely on two different abilities. This paper is 
prospective and exploratory. It does not pretend to provide a definite reply to this 
question. Nonetheless, as a conclusion I would like to review a few results that point 
towards a dual ability.  
 
One or two? 
At the beginning, I described the Single Perspective view, according to which there is 
one single ability to understand others, independent of the context. I have then 
emphasised the duality of functions of mindreading, as well as the duality of social 
frames of reference. However, to say that mindreading has two functions does not suffice 
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to show that there are two kinds of mindreading. One and the same ability could 
accomplish different functions. According to a principle of cognitive economy, it would 
be even more parsimonious to defend the Single Perspective view. To be able to argue in 
favour of the strong version of the Dual perspective view, one needs to leave armchair 
speculations and philosophical ruminations for experimental evidence. Unfortunately, 
this has not been really studied and there is almost no data on the existence of a  
dissociation between two mindreading abilities.  
Let me start first with a slightly different domain than mindreading, that is, action 
observation. It has been shown that brain activation differs relative to the aim of the 
observation of the action (Decety et al., 1997). If you observe the action in order to be 
able to recognise it later, you activate structures dedicated to memory encoding. In 
contrast, if you observe the action in order to be able to imitate it later, you activate the 
regions involved in the planning and in the generation of actions. Put it another way, 
action observation differs whether it is knowledge-oriented or interaction-oriented. It 
shows that observation of other people can be affected by the role played by the 
observation. 
Similarly, one might suggest comparing two versions of the false belief task. I 
described the false belief task as a typical example of knowledge-oriented mindreading. 
However, we could suggest a slightly modified version of the standard task to test 
interaction-oriented mindreading. Rather than being the external witness of a story 
involving two remote characters, the child could be directly involved in the story 
(Gallagher, 2005). For instance, the child in presence of two examiners puts a chocolate 
in a basket. One of the examiners leaves and the other suggests to the child to put the 
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chocolate somewhere else. The child removes the chocolate and puts it in a box. Then the 
examiner who has left comes back. In contrast to the standard version, the child would be 
directly in interaction with the target to whom he ascribes a belief about the location of 
the chocolate. He is the one who has tricked the target. Intentional deceptive behaviour 
involves the intention to induce a false belief in the other. Interestingly, it has been shown 
that children spontaneously deceive other children as early as 3-years-old (Carlson et al., 
1998). However, they are able to understand deception only at 4-years-old (Perner, 1991). 
Therefore, I would suggest that children would have greater ability in this task than in the 
standard false belief task. If we could show that interaction-oriented mindreading has a 
different developmental story than knowledge-oriented mindreading, then it would be a 
good starting point to argue for the Dual Perspective view.  
As far as I know, a systematic comparison between the two versions of the false belief 
task has never been done and the literature about deceptive behaviour in children is not 
always consistent. Furthermore, even if we could show an improvement with the 
interactive false belief task, it could be argued that the difference between the two 
versions is just a question of difficulty. The classical version of the false belief task is 
indeed highly difficult and demanding (Bloom and German, 2000). When the task is 
made simpler by using more specific or more pragmatic questions or by giving memory 
aid, even three-years-old children succeed (Lewis & Osborne, 1990; Siegal & Beattie, 
1991; Freeman & Lacohée, 1995; Surian & Leslie, 1999). Similarly, the interactive task 
would just make the task simpler. The false belief task requires more than just 
mindreading, and the additional processing capacities could be responsible for the failure 
in the classical version. Consequently, it will not be easy to provide conclusive evidence 
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of a dual way of understanding others. 
There are however some preliminary results that show the role of social relationships 
for mindreading. It was noticed in the 1950s that people coming from an ethnic minority 
had a deeper understanding of the „white mentality‟ than vice-versa (Dollard, 1957). The 
underlying assumption is that people in a weaker position need to know more about the 
others to be able to get what they want and to compensate for their lower social status: 
Whereas a more powerful person might be able to manipulate another‟s 
behaviour using brute force alone, a less powerful person would not be able 
to change another‟s behaviour without tracking mental states. A person of 
average or below-average status is especially dependent on ToM [Theory of 
Mind] reasoning to control their social situations through negotiations, 
bargaining, threatening, appeasing, etc. (Rutherford, 2004, p. 92) 
Putting it another way, you have better be aware of the feelings and thoughts of your 
boss if you want to gain his favour. But your boss does not care what you feel. 
Interestingly, when one is given the role of subordinate in an experimental situation, one 
becomes better in assessing the feeling of others, and conversely, when the same person 
is attributed the role of leader, one becomes less good (Snodgrass, 1985). Rutherford 
(2004) used the classical false belief task to evaluate whether social status can indeed 
affect mindreading. Subjects first participated in a general quiz game, but unbeknownst to 
them some received an easy version and the others, a difficult version, leading to two 
groups, the Winners and the Losers. In order to introduce a hierarchy between them even 
more, the Losers were later taught and evaluated by the Winners. They all then took a 
false belief task. The results showed that the Losers had a better performance than the 
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Winners (i.e. less errors and shorter reaction time). Rutherford concluded that people 
with a lower social status allocate more resources to mindreading. One might regret that 
the author used a classical false belief task based on story telling. It would have been 
even more interesting if the Losers had to judge the Winners‟ false belief and vice-versa. 
Furthermore, one may also suggest a slightly different interpretation of the results. The 
Losers felt in competition with the others. They wanted to win at least at this task. In 
contrast, the Winners had nothing to prove. They did not feel in competition with the 
others. They might not even pay attention to the others. Putting it another way, some took 
into account their social relationship with the others and felt themselves to be in a social 
situation of competition, while the others simply did the task as required. The difference 
in performance could then reflect a difference between interaction-oriented and 
knowledge-oriented mindreading. However, once again it does not tell us whether both 
rely on the same ability or not. It might be just a question of motivation and resource 
allocation. 
The best way to argue for a conceptual distinction is to provide a case of double 
dissociation. If an individual is impaired in A and not in B, and if another individual is 
impaired in B and not in A, then we are entitled to conclude that A and B are two distinct 
abilities. The problem here is that we do not have such double dissociation. However, as 
a starting point, we might be interested in Asperger syndrome. Although people with 
Asperger syndrome sometimes succeed in the false belief task, they still show strong 
social impairments characterised by the inability to interact with peers and a lack of 
desire to do so, a poor appreciation of social cues, and socially and emotionally 
inappropriate responses. I have argued with Uta Frith that their impairment can be 
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explained in part by a disconnection between egocentric and allocentric representations 
of others (Frith and de Vignemont, 2005; de Vignemont and Frith, 2007). While we know 
– with some exceptions – when to use an egocentric or an allocentric frame of reference, 
they are unable to switch appropriately from one to the other. In social interaction, they 
display an extreme egocentrism, leading them to ignore that the others have their own 
existence independent of themselves. As for social observation, either they are not 
interested or they use a very abstract and detached view of the social world, completely 
disconnected from what they themselves would feel in such situations. However, there is 
no experimental data to support our hypothesis, merely autobiographical cues. It would 
be interesting to investigate in further detail mindreading abilities in Asperger syndrome. 
This leads us to the core question. What could be the experiment to test the Dual 
Perspective view? We would need to compare two situations: the subject in presence of 
two persons interacting with each other and the subject interacting with one of the two. 
The type of interaction should be the same. In both conditions, the subject would be 
required to judge the mental state of the same person. One would have to make sure that 
in both conditions, the subject pays as much attention and is as motivated. If we could 
show differences of performance, then we would have an argument for the strong version 
of the Dual Perspective view. This would be even stronger if we could find distinct neural 
networks activated in the two conditions. We could also expect the differences in 
performance to vary relative to the age. In addition, people with Asperger syndrome 
might display a different pattern of performance. However, as long as we do not have 
such type of evidence, we are limited to emphasise the importance of the conceptual 
distinction between knowledge-oriented and interaction-oriented mindreading. It makes a 
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difference whether mindreading is used for social interaction or for social observation.   
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